Perlovsky, Leonid (2012) Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science. Open Journal of Philosophy, 02 (01). pp. 32-37. ISSN 2163-9434
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Abstract
Freedom of will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be a fundamental mechanism of the mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | ScienceOpen Library > Social Sciences and Humanities |
Depositing User: | Managing Editor |
Date Deposited: | 13 Feb 2023 10:26 |
Last Modified: | 22 Aug 2024 12:45 |
URI: | http://scholar.researcherseuropeans.com/id/eprint/507 |